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The late Colonel John Boyd developed what he called the OODA-Loop as both 
a learning and decision making model to help us better understand how we make 
decisions and learn. His OODA-Loop model consists of non-sequential elements: 
Observe – Orient – Decide – Action. He contended if one could cycle through these 
phases quicker and more accurately than one’s adversary you could then get inside 
your adversary’s OODA-Loop and “win”. The key to the OODA-Loop he noted is 
Orientation. He only drew one diagram of his OODA-Loop. Only in the Orientation 
phase did he elaborate component elements. These elements are: Cultural Traditions, 
Genetic Heritage, Analysis/Synthesis, New Information, and Previous Experience. 
All of these elements he contended are interconnected. Thus, the interaction of all 
these factors effects how we orient ourselves to the situation at hand. In this article I 
will share my view of the “Culture Factor” in Orientation.
Key words: OODA-Loop, cultural traditions, genetic heritage, analysis/
synthesis, new information, previous experience
1. INTRODUCTION
By way of introduction I want 
to  ﬁ   rst discuss what the OODA-
Loop is and then what it is not. You 
will make numerous assumptions 
based on your mental image of it. 
I suggest that if you visualize the 
OODA-Loop as Boyd diagramed 
it your accompanying assumptions 
will be quite different from all other 
depictions. To those readers who 
have studied Col. Boyd and have 
seen his depiction of the OODA-
Loop I apologize for I do not want 
to come across as condescending. 
For those who are not as familiar, the 
distinction between the two diagrams 
is signiﬁ  cant. 
As you can readily see from the 
diagram in Figure 1 the OODA-Loop 
is both complex and dynamic. Boyd 
drew his diagram once and ﬁ  gure 1 is 
how he illustrated it. As human beings 
we constantly go through this OODA-
Loop process every minute we are 
awake. Perhaps our minds continue 
while we are asleep. That notion on 
my part is only speculative. When 
you drive a car you are constantly, and 
unconsciously, looping and looping 
and looping. Your orientation is on your driving but you are constantly 
observing, gathering, and ﬁ  ltering 
information from your surroundings. 
Usually your driving habits improve 
as you gain more experience behind 
the wheel. 
Military training and education, 
for example, helps you learn new 
skills and improve those you already 
have. Simulators help pilots perfect 
their knowledge of the aircraft, hone 
ﬂ  ying skills, develop better situational 
awareness, etc. In a previous issue of 
this Journal Dr. Laurian Gherman 
stated that the OODA-Loop is a 
learning model[1], and it is. But it 
is also much more than that. In the 
same issue, Dr. Cezar Vasilescu wrote 
that the OODA-Loop is a decision-
making model.[2] He too is correct.
Figure 1. Boyd’s OODA-Loop[3].
Unfortunately too many 
researchers, educators, military 
professionals, and others do not use 
Boyd’s illustration, rather they have 
opted for a representation that overly 
simpliﬁ   es the OODA-Loop, see 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Simpliﬁ  ed version of Boyd’s 
OODA- Loop
One reason this depiction is 
so misleading is it grossly over 
simpliﬁ  es the OODA-Loop. 
Second the Figure 2 representation 
suggests that the OODA-Loop is base 
on stage theory, which deﬁ  nitely is 
not the case. A stage model approach 
means that the individual ﬁ  rst 
Observes an event, then Orients to 
it, Decides on a course of action, and 
thence Acts on that decision.
Then the process is repeated. If one 
understands the OODA-Loop from 
this perspective the only conclusion 
one can reach is that the person who 
makes faster decisions wins. Nothing 
could be further   from the truth. If you are improperly oriented you make 
wrong decisions faster and thereby 
dig your hole deeper more quickly. 
Let me provide two examples 
to clarify the point I am trying to 
make. During the Vietnam Conﬂ  ict 
senior US military leaders were 
incorrectly oriented to the situation. 
They expected and wanted to ﬁ  ght 
a conventional war. As a result the 
Army and Air Force each had two 
matrices to measure success. These 
were body count and battles won 
(Army) and target sets bombed and 
bomb tonnage dropped (Air Force). It 
was not until Ambassador Ellsworth 
Bunker, General Creighton Abrams, 
and William Colby replaced the old 
breed and formed a Department of 
State, Military, and CIA triumvirate. 
This new triumvirate changed our 
orientation and we started ﬁ  ghting a 
population centric counterinsurgency 
type of war [4]. But, by then 
the American home front had 
been lost leading us to withdraw 
with our tails between our legs.
A more recent example is 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In 
this case the Bush Administration 
and General Tommy Franks were 
focused on ﬁ  ghting Desert Storm II. 
During the months and weeks leading 
up to the launching of OIF, Saddam 
Hussein showed off his military 
prowess with parades and other types 
of military demonstrations that were 
air on television. Among the forces 
always present were the white clad 
Saddam Fedayeen. No one took 
notice. 
When the American units ﬁ  nally 
met the Fedayeen on the battleﬁ  eld 
it took a little time to adjust, but the 
young soldiers on the ground as well as 
their immediate commanders quickly 
reoriented themselves. Battalion 
and Brigade commanders told 
their superior ofﬁ  cers that we were 
ﬁ  ghting an insurgency, but were not 
believed. Lieutenant Generals Scott 
Wallace and John Conway were the 
ﬁ  rst two senior ofﬁ  cers to recognize 
that there was an insurgency going 
on inside of conventional military 
operations. Unfortunately for 
Wallace he shared this information 
during a joint interview with the New 
York Times and Washington Post [5]. 
It was only because of Lieutenant 
General McKiernan’s intervention 
with General Franks that he was not 
relieved of his command for stating 
in his interview “The enemy we’re 
ﬁ  ghting is a bit different than the one 
we war-gamed against, because of 
these paramilitary forces.”[6]
To emphasize again if you are 
not oriented to a situation correctly, 
whether it is in the military, business, 
politics, etc., it makes no difference 
how quickly you learn because you 
will not observe the situation or 
process new information correctly. If 
you are not oriented properly it makes 
no difference how quickly you make 
decisions. Although other factors, 
as depicted in ﬁ  gure 1, are involved 
as well your cultural traditions are a 
signiﬁ  cant factor in interpreting your 
observations and thus the decisions 
you make.
2. CULTURE IN ORIENTATION
In his depiction of Orientation 
in his OODA-Loop diagram Boyd 
included cultural traditions interacting 
with the other factors genetic 
heritage, previous experiences, new information, and analysis/synthesis 
in a dynamic fashion. Yet the only 
explanation he gives about this is 
in his brieﬁ  ng titled Organic Design 
for Command and Control slide 
11 where he states “Interactions, 
as shown, represent a many-sided 
implicit cross-referencing process 
of projection, empathy, correlation, 
and rejection.”[7] Two slides later 
he notes: “Orientation, seen as a 
result, represents images, views, or 
impressions of the world shaped by 
genetic heritage, cultural tradition, 
previous experiences, and unfolding 
circumstances.”[8] In his seminal 
text on the OODA-Loop Colonel 
Frans Osinga, Ph.D. contends that 
“Boyd has developed the argument 
that orientation is the center of 
gravity for command and control.”[9] 
Later in his presentation Boyd states 
“Orientation is the schwerpunkt. It 
shapes the way we interact with the 
environment – hence orientation 
shapes the way we observe, the way 
we decide, the way we act.”[10] 
What is it then that Boyd trying to 
tell us? He is saying the orientation 
is a factor of the dynamic interaction 
of one’s genetic heritage, cultural 
traditions, new information, previous 
experiences, and our analysis and 
synthesis of all these factors. The 
process is such that this interaction is 
constantly and rapidly cycling over 
and over again. Additionally, we do it 
unconsciously. And, if we understand 
this process there are many ways 
we can inﬂ  uence it – education and 
training for example.
With regard to culture we need 
to know what it is and why it is 
important. The Canadian Foreign 
Service Institute (CFSI) is helpful in 
this matter. CFSI contends:
“Culture rules virtually every 
aspect of your life and like most 
people, you are completely unaware 
of this. If asked, you would likely 
deﬁ   ne culture as music, literature, 
visual arts, architecture or language, 
and you wouldn't be wrong. But you 
wouldn't be entirely right either. In 
fact the things produced by a culture 
which we perceive with our ﬁ  ve senses 
are simply manifestations of the 
deeper meaning of culture – what we 
do, think and feel. Culture is taught 
and learned and shared – there is no 
culture of one. And yet, culture is not 
monolithic – individuals exist within 
a culture. Finally, culture is symbolic. 
Meaning is ascribed to behaviour, 
words and objects and this meaning 
is objectively arbitrary, subjectively 
logical and rational. For example, 
a "home", is a physical structure, 
a familial construct and a moral 
reference point – which is distinct 
from one culture to another.
Culture is vital because it enables 
its members to function with one 
another without the need to negotiate 
meaning at every moment. Culture 
is learned and forgotten, so despite 
its importance we are generally 
unconscious of its inﬂ   uence on the 
manner in which we perceive the 
world and interact within it. Culture 
is signiﬁ  cant because as we work with 
others it both enables us and impedes 
us in our ability to understand and 
work effectively together.”[11] 
If we simply look at our cultural 
traditions we need to ask ourselves 
how these traditions help us learn and 
make decisions? Schein reminds us 
that there are three levels of culture – 
Artifacts (visible structures/processes 
and observable behaviors), Espoused 
Beliefs and Values (ideals and goals, ideologies, rationalizations, etc.) 
and Basic Underlying Assumptions 
(unconscious, taken-for-granted 
beliefs and values) [12]. The CIA 
World Factbook 2012 may be helpful 
and a good starting point. The book 
reports that according to the 2002 
census there were more than 7 ethnic 
groups in Romania speciﬁ  cally 
Romanian, Hungarian, Roma, 
Ukrainian, German, Russian, Turkish, 
and other [13]. Each of these ethnic 
groups has its own cultural traditions. 
If we include the element of religion, 
Eastern Orthodox, Protestant, Roman 
Catholic, Muslim, none, etc. [14] as 
an additional factor we see how one’s 
cultural tradition becomes more 
robust. Each ethnic group has the 
three levels that deﬁ  ne how members 
observe their environment. The three 
levels of culture of each religious 
group add yet another cultural 
heritage dynamic.
Schein further notes that every 
organization has its own culture. Thus 
a person of ethnic group A with a 
religious background of X becomes 
a member of an organization, such 
as the military, they adapt to that 
organization’s cultural dynamics. 
Builder tells us that military services 
and institutions have their own distinct 
and enduring personalities (cultural 
traditions). Thus we cannot simply 
assume that all members of a nation’s 
military view their environments in a 
similar fashion [15]. These factors and 
others as well, affect how people from 
different nationalities, organizations, 
military services, etc. can observe 
the same situation and have quite 
different interpretations that result in 
their making different decisions.
If you are trying to sell your 
program to a staff member from a 
different service, or a politician, or 
the public you might become quite 
frustrated because they may be 
perceiving things quite differently 
because of their cultural tradition. 
Although these differences may be 
intuitive they may be more dramatic 
than that. 
Several years ago I was 
conducting some research on culture. 
My Google search identiﬁ  ed  the 
Canadian Foreign Service Institute 
(CFSI) web site among others. As 
I worked my way around the site I 
hit upon a short presentation about 
a man visiting a foreign country. He 
could not understand why he could 
not communicate well, interact with 
the local people, or integrate himself 
into the community. After reﬂ  ecting 
on the situation he realized that 
every one of the locals wore green 
glasses. He therefore concluded that 
if he purchased green glasses then his 
orientation would be like that of the 
locals. When he put the green glasses 
on not much changed because he 
failed to consider that the people 
from his country always wore yellow 
glasses. He simply put the green 
glasses over his yellow ones. 
My point here is that even if 
we know and understand our own 
cultural traditions that may not be 
enough to succeed in a joint staff 
assignment, working with political 
leaders, or even succeeding on the 
battleﬁ  eld. As I noted previously the 
American experiences in Vietnam 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom may 
be illustrative. In Vietnam, our 
senior military leaders wanted to 
and expected to ﬁ  ght a conventional 
war. Why was this so? It was because 
they all fought in World War II and 
Korea – two conventional wars. Army doctrine supported force on 
force conﬂ  ict and this was reinforced 
because we were focused on the 
‘real’ war and expected confrontation 
with the Soviets in Europe. Air Force 
leaders were wedded to the culture 
of the Strategic Air Command which 
was built upon the foundation of 
the WWII Bombing Campaign and 
Japan’s surrender after dropping two 
atomic bombs on Japan. Furthermore 
Air Force leaders believed that had 
they been allowed to employ airpower 
properly we would have easily won.
[16] So that is how we fought – a 
strategic air campaign. If they had 
studied the cultural traditions of the 
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese 
things may or may not have been 
different. Our opponents saw us as 
colonial occupiers. Their cultural 
tradition in ﬁ   ghting occupiers was 
by  ﬁ   ghting unconventionally as 
insurgents.
In Operation Iraqi Freedom 
General Tommy Franks and his 
boss Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld believed they were going 
to  ﬁ  ght another Desert Storm type 
of war. In spite of evidence to the 
contrary they never deviated from this 
belief. Their orientation inﬂ  uenced 
all their decisions. Unfortunately 
their orientation, partially inﬂ  uenced 
by cultural traditions, was ﬂ  awed and 
today we are paying the price for that 
error.
3. MITIGATING 
THE CULTURE FACTOR
What can we do rather than 
simply putting on different colored 
glasses?
Boyd’s message to us about 
orientation on slide 18 of the same 
brieﬁ   ng maybe helpful: “Expose 
individuals, with different skills 
and abilities, against a variety of 
situations -- whereby each individual 
can observe and orient himself 
simultaneously to the others and to the 
variety of changing situations.”[17]
I believe that Boyd may be 
suggesting things such as Joint 
Professional Military Education 
schools to include attending 
service schools of one’s allies, joint 
assignments, participating in cultural 
exchanges, and so forth. Studying 
foreign languages, reading books 
about culture, watching foreign 
television programs and listening to 
foreign radio programs may also be 
helpful. But I do not think that goes 
far enough if we want to mitigate our 
own cultural prejudices. 
The CFSI publishes a number 
of materials that provide insight 
into this difﬁ  culty. One publication 
states that people need to become 
interculturally effective. Such a 
person has three main attributes: an 
ability to communicate with people 
of another culture in a way that 
earns their respect and trust. Has the 
capacity to adapt his/her professional, 
technical, and managerial skills 
to  ﬁ   t local constraints; and has 
the capacity to adjust personally 
so that they can make themselves 
at ease in the host culture [18]. 
Although this publication does not 
discuss its course on to develop the 
attributes mentioned it does contain 
a list of competencies and behavioral 
indicators [19]. Knowing what these 
are it is not too difﬁ  cult to develop 
educational and training programs 
to teach the necessary competencies 
from the lowest ranking service 
member to senior leaders.In a different publication the 
CFSI discusses the issue of self-
monitoring behavior [20]. Citing 
research on cultural values CFSI 
noted  “that national cultures 
vary in main dimensions – power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism and masculinity – and 
that these differences ‘have profound 
consequences for the validity of the 
transfer of theories and working 
methods from one country to 
another.” [21] 
Recently Lesenciuc and Codreanu 
wrote an article for the Romanian 
Journal of Defense Resources 
Management emphasizing the point. 
They use the term cultural competence 
meaning the ability to “adequately 
perform in a given environment”.
[22] In addition, Lesenciuc and 
Codreanu note the importance of 
communication competence which 
“refers not only to the capacity 
to adapt to the surrounding 
environment, but also to the physical 
and psychological features of an 
individual that enable the latter’s 
communicative performance in a 
given environment.”[23]
Training and education are but two 
important ways we can mitigate our 
own cultural prejudices. But it takes 
time and effort on each individual’s 
part as well. A formal process needs 
to begin when one enters, in our case, 
military service. The individual needs 
to understand why being culturally 
effective is important. We need to 
learn the self-monitoring behaviors 
and practice them until they become 
an unconscious way of life. Some will 
have us believe that the youngest and 
less educated soldier cannot master 
these skills. This is not true. 
When General H.R. McMaster 
learned that the 3rd Armored 
Cavalry Regiment (3rd ACR) he 
commanded was tasked to deploy to 
Iraq he organized and implemented a 
comprehensive training regimen that 
included cultural effectiveness. Upon 
deployment to the Iraqi city of Tal Afar 
which was an insurgent hot bed his 
soldiers immediately began utilizing 
the skills and knowledges they had 
learned in their pre-deployment 
training. They successfully eradicated 
the insurgents from the city helping 
the locals establish law and order. 
We may not always have the 
lead time General McMaster and 
his 3rd ACR had. This is especially 
true when it comes to peacekeeping, 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and 
similar missions. But it we start now 
and make being culturally effective 
a priority then we will be able to 
mitigate our own cultural prejudices. 
Our self-monitoring will become one 
of our cultural traditions.
Cultural effectiveness is not 
limited to conﬂ   ict or conﬂ  ict-like 
situations. Cultural competence and 
effectiveness will help us work better 
and more closely with colleagues from 
different services and specialties. For 
example, consider representative 
from each of the military services 
along with several legislators having 
a discussion perhaps about the need 
for new items of equipment. Have 
you noticed that it is difﬁ  cult  for 
them to comprehend what each 
other means? Perhaps they lack both 
cultural knowledge and the cultural 
communications competence skills 
to be understood. 
In addition, cultural and 
communication competence or 
effectiveness will help us in working with allied and coalition partners. 
It will also help us in working 
with our political leaders. Cultural 
effectiveness is important in other 
ﬁ   elds as well such as business, 
education, and interaction with our 
neighbors.
In summary, cultural traditions 
affect how we orient ourselves to a 
particular situation so we can observe 
it more accurately. We can mitigate 
some elements of our genetic heritage 
through medicine and good health. 
We can do the same with our cultural 
traditions.
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